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Abstract
While the literature on capital adequacy and bank recapitalization agrees on the importance of a
minimum capital requirement, recurring financial crises across the world do little to suggest that
capital adequacy is enough protection for banks, even when they fully comply. By examining the
case of regulation compelled banking recapitalizations in a cross-country context (during the
period 1990Q1 to 2016Q2), we scrutinize the effectiveness of banking recapitalization on the
economies of recently recapitalized countries. We provide implications for international business
research, practice and policy by highlighting the need for countries adopting the Basel capital
adequacy framework to pay attention to the peculiarities of their economies, the supporting
regulatory mechanisms and their comparative spare capacities.
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11. Introduction
The Basel regulatory capital frameworks focused on the need to create an adequate level of capital
in the international banking system (Bank for International Settlements, 1988; 2001; 2011; 2013).
Where there is a shortfall, banks are required or compelled by regulation to recapitalize. In
agreement with such capital requirements, the bulk of the empirical literature in this space suggests
that banking recapitalization improves the banking system’s efficiency (VanHoose, 2007; Francis
and Osborne, 2012). This literature argues that banking recapitalization increases the ability to
expand the traditional lending role of banks in the economy and allows banks to have an increased
ability to withstand adverse economic pressures, thereby providing more stability for international
businesses and the international banking system (Berger and Bouwman, 2013 and Repullo and
Suarez, 2013). However, even in the face of complete adherence to such capital requirements, the
international banking system has consistently witnessed crises. This has led to questions about the
effectiveness of capital adequacy requirements in ensuring bank vitality and depositors’ protection.
For instance, the failure to avert the 2007/2008 global financial crisis is the most recent criticism
regarding the effectiveness of the Basel banking capital requirements in ensuring banking system
stability.1
Previous empirical studies examining the effectiveness of banks’ capital requirements have
focused on immediate banking sector indices such as profitability, competition, loan creation, cost
efficiency, amongst other micro indicators (see for example, Apergis, Fafaliou and Polemis, 2016;
Francis and Osborne, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). These studies mostly relied on the
1 A recent study by Markman and Venzin (2014) examined the resilience of the banking industry using the recent
financial crisis as a stress test.
2assessments of banks’ performance under inadequate and adequate capital, usually targeting
periods, before, during and after recapitalization, to examine the effectiveness of banking
recapitalization. However, there has been almost no attempt to understand the wider effectiveness
of banking recapitalization on macroeconomic indicators such as industrial production, stock
market indices, inflation rates, amongst others, especially in regulation compelled
recapitalizations. Through the reactions of macroeconomic variables within five economies
(Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain and USA) chosen based on a defined selection criteria
(highlighted in Section 4), this paper addresses this gap in literature and makes two important
contributions to international business discourse.
First, this paper examines the effectiveness of banking recapitalization in the economies where
banks were compelled to recapitalize by regulatory authorities in recent times. Specifically, we
tested for the counter suggestion in Barrios and Blanco (2003) which argued that market forces
rather than regulatory changes should determine banks’ capital requirements. We tested the
influence of regulatory compelled banking recapitalization on broad economic indicators such as
industrial production (IP), exchange rate (ER), stock market index (SI), inflation (IR) and lending
rate (LR). Our approach differs from the extant empirical studies which focused more on
immediate banking sector variables (Apergis, Fafaliou and Polemis, 2016; Francis and Osborne,
2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Even while the studies of Repullo and Suarez (2013) as well
as Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) applied macroeconomic variables, these studies did not
address the effectiveness of banking recapitalization on the economies of regulation compelled
recapitalizing countries. While Repullo and Suarez (2013) concentrated on comparing Basel’s
capital regimes, Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) focused on the interaction between capital
requirements and monetary policy. Similarly, Francis and Osborne (2012) only considered the
3exogenous effects of GDP (which is too general as an indicator of economic growth) on banking
recapitalization. However, industrial production provides a more specific measure of banking
recapitalization given its penchant for improving lending activities to the real sector of the
economy (Dell'Ariccia, Detragiache and Rajan, 2008). A further dimension of our contribution
here is our analysis of the effect of banking recapitalization on different sectors of the economy, a
perspective which the extant empirical studies have not considered.
Our second contribution to international business literature comes from our examination of the
periodic effect of banking recapitalization. Studying short-run dynamics as compared to long-run
equilibrium provides a better understanding of the recapitalization effect. This allows us to
delineate whether such effects are enduring or short-lived. Here, previous studies mostly focused
on the broad time effect, with limited effort aimed at understanding whether banking
recapitalization has short-run or long-run economic effects. Some of the existing studies examined
crisis and crisis-free times (see e.g., Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). As such, the exogenous
application of macroeconomic variables under a broad timeframe as seen in Francis and Osborne
(2012) is varied in the current study to account for direct periodic effects. Accounting for periodic
effect will enable us to understand the wider economic implication of banking recapitalization on
the productive sector and the dynamics of banking recapitalization in a cross-country context.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature,
including the relationship between banking recapitalization and macroeconomic indicators. The
methodology and models are discussed in section 3. We present our data in section 4, where we
also explain the choice of our investigated variables. In section 5, we present, analyze and discuss
4our results on the economic significance of banking recapitalization. In our concluding section,
we present some implications of our study.
2. Review of Literature on Banking Recapitalization: An International Appraisal
The capital adequacy ratio stipulated in the Basel regulatory framework remains a widely
acceptable measure for risk-based capital requirement internationally. This is vastly achieved
through the stipulation of a minimum2 capital adequacy ratio which regulators enforce in ensuring
that banks can absorb reasonable amounts of losses due to their operations. Where this falls below
the minimum, banks will be required to recapitalize. However, different countries have had diverse
experiences from banking recapitalization. For example, the recapitalization experiences of
Malaysia (Sufian and Habibullah, 2013), Mexico (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007; Maudos and
Solís, 2011), USA (Repullo and Suarez, 2013) and Spain (Montes, 2014) resulted in a stronger
banking and financial system. Both Maudos and Solís (2011) and Montes (2014), respectively,
pointed how the Mexican and the Spanish economies were able to use banking recapitalization in
managing adverse consequences of economic crises. Also, Sufian and Habibullah (2013)
discussed how the Malaysian banking recapitalization was able to steer the economy out of the
1997 Asian financial crisis. In contrast, the Nigerian banking system became exposed to distress,
with eight out of the country’s twenty five banks having to be rescued by the central bank less
than three years after the country’s 2005 banking recapitalization program (Central Bank of
Nigeria, 2011).3 The Nigerian example contradicts empirical findings, for example in Maudos and
2 The Basel framework stipulates a common minimum holding of 8% risk-weighted assets for all international banks.
3 We recognise that other factors relating to behavioural tendencies may contribute to some of these failures (for
example, see VanHoose, 2007; Francis and Osborne, 2012).
5Solís (2011) and Montes (2014), which suggest that a country’s banking sector would be capable
of avoiding financial distress by recapitalizing.
Different countries also have divergent targets with regards to recapitalization. On the one hand,
apart from the US which has the tradition of continuous banking sector reforms, most of the
aforementioned countries went into banking recapitalization to avert or react to a financial crisis.
The Malaysian banking recapitalization, for example, was largely a reaction to the 1997 Asian
financial crisis (Sufian and Habibullah, 2013), while the Spanish banking recapitalization was a
direct response to the 2007-2008 global financial crisis (Montes, 2014). On the other hand, Barrios
and Blanco (2003) suggest that market forces, rather than, regulatory changes determine banks’
capital requirements. This implies that an economy has to be witnessing expansion activities for
an increase in the banking sector capital base to be able to make much impact. Therefore, a growth
in industrial production which is linked to improved bank lending as a result of recapitalization is
expected to impact the economy positively.
Despite adherence to the Basel regulatory risk-based capital requirement by most countries, it is
still not clear if such a measure is able to achieve the desired protection for banks in recapitalizing
countries. Even as we see a compelling level of support for banking recapitalization (VanHoose,
2007; Francis and Osborne, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013; and Repullo and Suarez, 2013),
the effectiveness of such exercise on the economies of recapitalizing countries is not clear.
However, banking recapitalization potentially increases banks’ ability to expand their lending role
as it gives access to more capital, which is expected to bring about economic expansion and
stimulate more business activities.
6However, the focus of previous studies has been on the assessments of banks’ performance during
and after recapitalization. Here, studies have traditionally not examined the effectiveness of
banking recapitalization on macroeconomic indicators. This gap in literature has begun to gain
attention. For example, the effect of some macroeconomic indicators is documented in empirical
studies such as Sufian and Habibullah (2013) as well as Maudos and Solís (2011) who respectively
studied the Malaysian and Mexican recapitalization impacts. In Nigeria, Adegbite (2015) also
highlighted the poor corporate governance practices, following banking recapitalization.
Furthermore, Francis and Osborne (2012) as well as Berger and Bouwman (2013) indicated how
poor behavioural conduct is capable of influencing the outcome of a banking recapitalization
exercise. However, there is little attempt aimed at understanding the effectiveness of banking
recapitalization on macroeconomic indicators such as industrial production, stock indices,
inflation rates, amongst others.
Another important gap in literature relates to the stipulation of a common holding of 8% risk-
weighted assets for all international banks included in Basel I framework (Bank for International
Settlements, 1988) as subsequently modified under Basel II and III frameworks.4 This provision
has failed to recognize the divergent economic fundamentals and development stage of the
different economies. By focussing on the wider economic effectiveness of banking recapitalization
through the reactions of macroeconomic variables within five economies, this paper addresses
these gaps in the literature. Our cross-country context narrative enriches international business
4 It is important to note that the central banks in different countries as well as different economic unions apply the
Basel capital adequacy requirement differently. For instance, the European Union countries, where Spain is a member,
are required to have fully-loaded average core equity capital ratio to risk-weighted assets of 12% as against the 8%
recommended in the Basel framework. Also, different countries ensure banking capital regulation is applied to their
specific requirement. Thus, even as the European Union ensure a regular review of the Basel framework for
consistency, the European Banking Authority implement the Basel framework to its member countries’ situations.
(Bank for International Settlements, 2014)
7discourse, given that the literature has concentrated on the effectiveness of banks’ capital
requirements, using micro-level banking sector indices and neglecting the wider macroeconomic
effectiveness.
Our empirical approach also helps to contribute to the literature. Although the literature linking
banking recapitalization and macroeconomic indicators is still evolving, a rich set of empirical
attempts are in existence.5 The macroeconomic variables examined in these studies, which relates
to banking capital, includes securities markets, monetary policy and productivity, GDP, stock
returns and inflation amongst others. For example, both Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Angelini,
Neri and Panetta (2014) focused on the need to understand the interaction between banking capital
regulation and monetary policy. While Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) relied on a general
equilibrium model to understand the interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy,
Angeloni and Faia (2013) applied a macro model. These approaches did not have a broad focus
and did less in terms of the specific challenge of measuring economic effectiveness of banking
recapitalization, an important issue which this research is attempting to address. Thus, we separate
the monetary policy variable applied in Angeloni and Faia (2013) and Angelini, Neri and Panetta
(2014) by estimating the effect of banking recapitalization on inflation, which provides us with
the much desired econometric solution to the problem. This is better assimilated than the dynamic
solution of the general equilibrium models presented in the extant studies.
Furthermore, the relationship between banks’ capital and stock return is equally examined in
Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012) as well as in Demirguc‐Kunt, Detragiache and
5 See Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012); Francis and Osborne (2012); Angeloni and Faia (2013); Demirguc‐
Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2013); Repullo and Suarez (2013); Angelini, Neri and Panetta (2014) for recent
examples.
8Merrouche (2013). Using different types of capital ratios, Demirguc‐Kunt, Detragiache and
Merrouche (2013) have found that stronger capital in banks lead to better stock market
performance during economic crisis. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012) found
countries in the process of economic development to have both their banks and securities markets
increase simultaneously. Both studies concentrated on the examination of banks’ stock returns
while ignoring the market index. As such, we consider the wider economic implication of banking
recapitalization given the overall stock market index. This approach enables us to understand the
larger effect of recapitalization on the economies of recapitalizing countries. Lastly, the effect of
banking recapitalization on productivity has received limited attention. Even as Francis and
Osborne (2012) examined the effects of banking recapitalization on the U.K. GDP, the empirical
process only considered the exogenous effect of the GDP.6 In addressing these gaps, we test for
the direct effect of banking recapitalization on the industrial production and inflation of the five
recapitalizing countries to understand the wider economic implication of banking recapitalization
on the productive sector.
The effectiveness of banking recapitalization in countries across five continents, including
Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain and USA were examined. We chose these economies using a
defined selection criterion which includes recent and similar banking recapitalization experiences,
and major economic influences in their respective continents. For instance, Nigeria is Africa’s
largest economy with a recent case of banking recapitalization (shortly before the 2007/2008
economic crisis), which remains largely unexamined. Nigeria also helps to serve as a contrasting
basis for our data sample. The US data are applied mainly due to the recent global economic crisis
6 While Demirgüç-Kunt, Feyen and Levine (2012) as well as Demirguc‐Kunt, Detragiache and Merrouche (2013)
included GDP and inflation in their samples, a prominent consideration was not given to these variables.
9which largely originated from the country’s subprime mortgage lending. Also, the US dollar is the
currency of international settlement with wide influence on the economies of most countries of
the world. Mexico and Spain are similarly considered due to their common adoption of banking
recapitalization as a response to the 2007-2008 economic crisis and Malaysia in response to the
1997 Asian financial crisis (Maudos and Solís, 2011; Sufian and Habibullah, 2013; Montes, 2014).
In combination, we examine these economies to provide a global spread to our sample, in addition
to providing a comparative analysis. There were both similarity and variance across the
experiences of the investigated countries, prominently reflecting a divide between developed and
developing economies. This presents an intriguing international business research, practice and
policy enquiry, which we examine in this paper. We do this by asking how effective the capital
adequacy ratio advocated by the Basel regulatory capital frameworks is in ensuring stability in the
banking system of investigated countries.
3. Methodology and Models
This paper examines the economic implications of banking recapitalization using a variant of the
Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (GFEVD) (Pesaran and Shin, 1998). GFEVD
explores the interrelationships between economic variables by explicitly accounting for
contemporaneous correlations between them. This expresses the percentage of the forecast error
variance of variable i that can be attributed to variable j. This is in addition to being invariant with
respect to the ordering of the variables in the model, a problem which the earlier forecast error
variance decomposition (Sims, 1980) has been unable to overcome. The model GFEVD also helps
to test the associated Impulse Response Functions (IRF) which examines the effect of shock
introduction due to banking recapitalization. In addition to doing these, we seek to further increase
the robustness of our empirical process by adopting the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL)
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model (Pesaran, Shin and Smith, 2001) as well as the causality procedure of Toda-Yamamoto
(Toda and Yamamoto, 1995).
In determining both IRF and their associated GFEVDs, the Vector Error Correction (VEC) also
has to be estimated. The VEC will seek to estimate a system of equations in a variant of the vector
autoregressive model (VAR). This is because the macroeconomic variables, such as industrial
production, inflation and exchange rates, which will help us to understand the impact of banking
recapitalization, are usually found to be non-stationary. In determining the VEC, an understanding
of the long-run relationships between associated variables is necessary. In the context of
establishing the economic effectiveness of banking recapitalization, the Johansen model (Johansen,
1988) for cointegration analysis offers a system approach in which more than one co-integrating
vector might be identified. Furthermore, the greater efficiency offered by the approach makes it
appropriate for our paper as opposed to other traditional approaches such as Engle and Granger
(1987) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995). The process is first carried out by identifying co-
integrating relationships, the residuals from which are then entered into a second VEC model. A
simplified two-variable VEC model takes the form below:
y2, t = βy1, t (1)
Δy1, t = α1(y2, t – 1 – βy1, t – 1) + γ1 Δy2, t-1 + e1, t (2)
Δy2, t = α2(y2, t – 1 – βy1, t – 1) + γ2 Δy1, t-1 + e2, t
where Eq. (1) is a co-integrating relationship and Eq. (2) is the VEC in which each of the dependent
variables, y1 and y2, adjusts to the deviation from the long-run equilibrium defined in Eq. (1), as
well as the preceding changes in the values of the other variable. However, moving to more than
two variables increases the numbers of potential in (1) and (2).
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VEC systemic analysis will usually consider a case of more than two variables, which may include
exogenous variables. In examining the effect of banking recapitalization on the economy, some
variables could be considered as exogenous to the model. The extant literature (for example,
Francis and Osborne, 2012; Berger and Bouwman, 2013) has indicated how variables such as
pricing, economic crisis, behavioural issues, amongst others, are capable of influencing the
outcome of a banking recapitalization exercise. Thus, given that the specific focus of the current
paper is on economic effectiveness, the global financial crisis in 2007/2008, and the earlier Asian
financial crisis of 1997-1999 are considered as exogenous factors capable of influencing the
outcome of banking recapitalization. This exogenous effect is captured in the form of a dummy
variable (DUM) relating to the global financial crises. The dummy effect takes the value of “1”
during the crisis years and “0” for the non-crisis years for both crises mentioned previously.
Consequently, the VEC will be modelled with an endogenous effect coming from the
macroeconomic variables, while the exogenous effect will come from the dummy variable
(DUM).7
In examining economic significance, the GFEVD can be constructed by generalising y1,t and y2,t
in Eq. (1) as a system of K variables. Yt, is written as an infinite moving average process:
0
t i t i
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the n step-ahead GFEVD is defined as
7 Capturing the effects of financial crises will help to disentangle the effect of recapitalization from the effect of the
financial/economic crises in our model. Therefore, in our dummy variable construction, we use the value “1” to
measure crises years and “0”to measures crises-free years.
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where ij denotes the jth diagonal entry of the residual covariance matrix, ; ej is the variable which
assumes forecast error attributed to j; and ei is a K×1 vector with 1 in the jth row and 0’s elsewhere.
In order to ease interpretation, Eq. (4) is therefore normalized as shown above.
 ij (n) 1
j1
K
 (5)
In Eq. (5), ij (n) is a measure of the cumulative system effects on variable i, which is a downstream
of an initial shock in variable j. Thus, since the focus of our paper is the economic implication of
banking recapitalization, GFEVDs will be presented as the aggregate of industrial production, the
stock market indices, the interest rate and the inflation rate. In addition to this, the associated IRF
will also be presented. The IRF will examine the effect of introducing a shock to the jth equation,
at time t (banking recapitalization), on the values of the ith variable, at time t+n (economic
indicators).
We further adopt the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) model proposed by Pesaran, Shin
and Smith (2001). There are five econometric advantages of the ARDL model for our study, which
include: i) it can be applied irrespective of whether the variables are integrated of order 1 (i.e.,
I(0)) or I(1) or fractionally integrated; ii) it can be applied regardless of the exogeneity and
stationarity assumptions of variables; iii) it can be applied without prior knowledge of the ranks
of the variables for cointegration; iv) it does not suffer from small sample bias; and v) it can
provide a joint estimation of both long-run and short-run parameters. We employ the following
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single equation reduced form of the ARDL method, adopting an unrestricted error correction
model (UECM):
∆ࢅ࢚= ࢻ૙ + ∑ ࢼ૚࢏࢔૚࢏ୀ૚ ∆ࢅ࢚ି ࢏+ ∑ ࢼ૛࢏࢔૛࢏ୀ૙ ∆ࢄ૚࢚ି ࢏+ ∑ ࢼ૜࢏࢔૜࢏ୀ૙ ∆ࢄ૛࢚ି ࢏+ ∑ ࢼ૝࢏࢔૝࢏ୀ૙ ∆ࢄ૜࢚ି ࢏+
∑ ࢼ૞࢏
࢔૞
࢏ୀ૙ ∆ࢄ૝࢚ି ࢏+ ∑ ࢼ૟࢏࢔૟࢏ୀ૙ ∆ࢄ૞࢚ି ࢏ࣅ૚ࢅ࢚ି ૚ + ࣅ૛ࢄ૚࢚ି ૚ + ࣅ૜ࢄ૛࢚ି ૚ + ࣅ૝ࢄ૜࢚ି ૚ + ࣅ૞ࢄ૝࢚ି ૚ +
ࣅ૟ࢄ૞࢚ି ૚ + ࢿ࢚ (6)8
where Y is one of the variables from the set of six factors as discussed previously (i.e., RECAP,
SI, LR, IP, ER and IR) and X1 to X5 are the remaining variables of the same set. βs and λs represent
the short-run effects as persistence measure of the variables and long-run parameters, respectively.
The notation ε is the white noise error term. The model also includes our exogenous binary dummy
variable. The optimal lag length is determined by the Akaike information and Schwarz criteria,
although we also paid attention to the absence of serial correlation in the residuals.
The ‘bounds’ test linked to the ARDL setting investigates the presence of long-term associations
among the variables before separately quantifying the short-term and long-term effects. In this test,
the F-statistics is provided with upper critical (assuming regressors are I(1)) and lower critical
(assuming regressors are I(0)) asymptotic bounds which helps to determine the presence of a long-
run relationship based on the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the level variables are jointly
zero.9 The t-test helps to examine the individual significance of coefficient estimates on the lagged
level dependent variable. Our ARDL procedure also produces an error correction term (ECT)
which can help clarify if there is a long-run causality as well as help to measure the speed of
convergence to a long-run equilibrium.
8 For brevity, the other equations in which X1, X2, X3, X4 and X5 are the dependent variables are not shown.
9 In other terms, Ho: λ1= λ2= λ3= λ4= λ5= λ6 =0 against Ha: at least one λ is non-zero. On the one hand, if our test
statistic is greater than the upper critical value, the presence of a long-term link is confirmed. On the other hand, if it
is lower, the null of ‘no cointegration’ cannot be rejected; and any figure in between suggests inconclusive evidence.
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In order to bring additional rigor to our results, we employ the causality procedure of Toda-
Yamamoto (Toda and Yamamoto, 1995). We chose this approach given that the standard Granger
causality method is not consistent, as it employs Wald test only in a long-run equilibrium situation.
Toda and Yamamoto (1995) suggested using a modified Wald (M-Wald) test statistics, which is
not conditional upon the cointegration and stationarity properties of series but has the standard
asymptotic distribution. In addition, unlike Granger test that is based on first-differencing, this
procedure employs variables in levels and hence mitigates the risk of wrongly identifying the order
of variables’ integration (I). This approach is illustrated as follows:
ࢅ࢚= ࢻ૙ + ∑ ࢼ૚࢏࢑࢏ୀ૚ ࢅ࢚ି ࢏+ ∑ ࢼ૛࢏ࢊ࢓ ࢇ࢞࢐ୀ࢑ା૚ ࢅ࢚ି ࢐+ ∑ ࣅ૚࢏࢑࢏ୀ૚ ࢄ࢚ି ࢏+ ∑ ࣅ૛࢏ࢊ࢓ ࢇ࢞࢐ୀ࢑ା૚ ࢄ࢚ି ࢐+ ࢿ࢚ (7)10
where Y or X is one of the aforementioned variables (i.e., RECAP, SI, LR, IP, ER and IR); α0, βs 
and λs are estimable parameters; and ε is the error term. The model also includes our exogenous 
binary dummy variable. We use a standard unrestricted VAR (k) setting and the optimal lag length
is determined by the Akaike information and Schwarz criteria. The notation dmax is the maximal
order of integration that this procedure requires to artificially extend the VAR system. The new
augmented system will therefore have the order “k + dmax”. The earliest lag is used for all
variables to treat them as exogenous whereas the latest lags are assigned to the same variables to
treat them as endogenous. To justify the presence of causality from X to Y in Eq. (7), λs should be 
statistically different from zero. Thus, the relevant null hypothesis is that ‘there is no causality
from variable X to variable Y’.
10 Again, for brevity, we did not show other equations in which the dependent variable is one of the aforementioned
six factors.
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4. Data and Sample Construction
Given this paper’s focus on the effectiveness of banking recapitalization on the economies of
regulation compelled recapitalizing countries11, we apply the following macroeconomic variables;
stock indices, industrial production, lending rate, exchange rate and inflation rate, which were
obtained from Thomson Reuters Datastream. In addition to these variables, we constructed a
recapitalization variable (RECAP)12 applied to measure the direct effect of recapitalization on the
aforementioned countries’ economies. We also applied a dummy variable (DUM) to capture the
exogenous effect relating to the 2007/2008 global financial crisis and the Asian financial crisis of
1997-1999. Adopting this approach helped to separate the effect of recapitalization from the effect
of the financial/economic crises. Given that the variables are economic indicators, the data were
obtained in a quarterly format. The sample period was from 1990Q1 to 2016Q2 which helped to
capture each country’s specific experience. The period allowed 5 to 10 years before a major
11 As mentioned earlier, the countries (Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain and USA) were selected based on five
unifying criteria which are: (1) countries with a case of regulation compelled banking recapitalization; (2) experience
of this occuring in recent times; (3) availability of data which cover a significant period before and after
recapitalization; (4) continental representativeness of the countries’ macroeconomic indicators, and (5) inclusion of
developing and developed economies. Of course, several factors are usually responsible for banking sector
recapitalization in a given economy (see e.g., Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007). However, we choose to concentrate on
the listed five given the focus of our paper, which is on regulatory compelled recapitalization.
12 We constructed the Recapitalization variable using the motivations (reasons) and timings of banking
recapitalizations in each country. For Mexico, Spain and the U.S., recapitalizations were largely as a response the
2008 global economic crisis, so we constructed RECAP variables for these countries to take effect from 2008Q1 up
until 2009Q4 (for guidance on precise recapitalization timings in these economies see Maudos and Solís, 2011;
Montes, 2014; Bank of Spain, 2015). Malaysia recapitalized as a response to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as a
result, we constructed a RECAP variable to take effect from 1997Q3 up until 1999Q2 (for timing guidance, see Central
Bank of Malaysia, 2002). Nigerian recapitalization was carried out in fulfilment of the Basel basic capital adequacy
requirement and took effect from 2006Q1. We, therefore, constructed the RECAP variable to last up to 2007Q4 (see
Central Bank of Nigeria, 2004). Thus, we assumed 8 quarters (2 years) as periods for the recapitalization effect on the
recapitalizing countries’ economies, basing our construction of the RECAP around the time which the countries
experienced regulatory compelled recapitalization. Therefore, we assume recapitalization effect will normally
commence on the year after start of the policy and last for 2 years. Hence, quarters of recapitalization take the effect
of “1” and quarters of no recapitalization take the effect of “0”. Timing of our recapitalization variables
selection/construction was also guided by the outcomes of the structural break timing of our sample (see Pesaran and
Timmermann, 2007 for more insights). See Table 2D for the outcomes of sample break test, which further indicates
that the majority of the break timing coincided with the recapitalization timing.
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recapitalization event and 5 to 10 years after recapitalization. The start and the end dates were
predetermined to coincide with periods of no banking recapitalizations and periods of banking
recapitalizations in each selected economy.
In addition, we selected countries bearing in mind continental spread/representation and based on
the classification provided in the World Bank’s database under World Development Indicators
(WDI) table (World Bank, 2015). The selected countries fulfilled the above set criteria and
between them accounted for about 30% of global GDP in 2014. Our sample also provided diversity,
continental experiences and global coverage, paying attention to geographic influence within
continental economy, trade and finance. Although, the selected countries shared the same
experience of banking recapitalization, they have also developed divergent outcomes from the
exercises, which constitute a subject of inquiry for this paper.
With respect to our selected variables, the number was determined on the basis of the rich set of
dynamics within the adopted VAR model, which allowed a simultaneous analysis of multiple
variables. Industrial production was included instead of GDP due to our aim of understanding the
effectiveness of banking recapitalization on the real sector of the economy. GDP measures broad
activities in the economy, whereas industrial production focuses on the industrial activities. Owing
to the usual target of banking reforms in improving lending activities to the real sector of the
economy, industrial production is a better measure for the objective of this study. Also, applying
GDP will be misleading for some of the countries in the data sample. Nigeria, for instance, gets
more than 90% of its foreign exchange earnings from oil (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2015). This
situation implies that oil makes a significant contribution to the country’s GDP.
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Furthermore, lending rates have important implications for the banking sector and hence the
economy. Lending rates largely determine borrowing choices for all economic agents (Gonzalez‐
Aguado and Suarez, 2015); the higher the rates, the lower the economic activities in the given
economy. Also, stock market index is included to capture the wider economic effectiveness of
banking recapitalization, which usually comes with increased stock market activities. This is either
caused through banking stock recapitalization or mergers/acquisitions of the existing banks.
Inflation rates are included to capture growth due to real growth or due to inflationary trend.
Exchange rates are adopted to test the effectiveness of banking recapitalization on local currency
exchange in relation to foreign currencies. Central banks traditionally maintain a strong foreign
reserve account to defend their local currency from depreciation. However, good international
perception on the strength of the local banking system can help to maintain a stable foreign
exchange. Additionally, the effect of the recent global economic crisis, which originated from the
US subprime mortgage lending, and the influence of the US dollar on the economies of
recapitalizing countries of the world could be captured by including exchange rates in the analysis.
The exchange rates of each analysed country’s currency in relation to the US dollars are the
adopted benchmark.
5. Data Analysis, Results and Discussions
Countries names are abbreviated as: MA, ME, N, S and US to represent Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria,
Spain and USA, respectively. Variables in each country are then named after these abbreviations.
As such, stock market indices, lending rates, industrial production, exchange rates and inflation
rates are respectively represented with the following acronyms: SI, LR, IP, ER and IR. Thus, our
data - MASI, MALR, MAIP, MAER and MAIR; MESI, MELR, MEIP, MEER and MEIR; NSI,
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NLR, NIP, NER and NIR; SSI, SLR, SIP, SER and SIR; USSI, USLR, USIP, USER and USIR,
represented the respective countries under consideration, while RECAP represents recapitalization
variable in the case of each country. Most variables were applied in their log and log difference
forms and these are indicated in the text where appropriate. The analyses of variables relating to
the different models were however applied in their most suitable form. For instance, cointegration
procedures were applied in log form, whereas the VEC procedures were applied in log difference
form, due to the different needs in analysing each situation.
In line with the tradition of time series data application, relevant diagnostics tests were carried out
to gauge the acceptability of the estimates. These procedures, in addition to other tests, such as the
unit root and Granger causality tests, were carried out in accordance with standard practice.13
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the selected variables. Most data series for the sample
period were relatively stable for the examined countries.
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
Tables 2A, 2B and 2C respectively presents augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Phillip-Perron (PP)
and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) stationarity tests. Table 2D is the outcome of the
structural break test. The ADF test results in Table 2A was carried out to check the datasets for
stationarity, and avoid the danger of spurious regression. On the left panel of the Table, the tests
reveal that Malaysian, Mexican, Nigerian and Spanish inflation rates are stationary in level terms.
All other variables in the series were found to be non-stationary in level terms. This data series
behavior is expected and usually common to times series data analysis. The right panel of the table
13 For relevance and brevity, only some of the preliminary and diagnostics process outcomes are reported here.
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reveals the ADF test results at first difference. Here, the outcomes of all tests become stationary
at the 1% level of significance.
[INSERT TABLES 2A and 2B HERE]
Table 2B presents the alternative Phillips-Perron (PP) stationarity test carried out based on Newey-
West (N-W) bandwidth criterion. Comparing the results of both ADF and P-P tests from Tables
2A and 2B reveals no significant difference between the two tests outcomes. Only Malaysian and
Nigerian inflation rates are stationary in level terms. To minimise the potential bias towards I(1),
we further implemented the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test to check for
conformity. Table 2C is the KPSS test outcomes which suggest that the results have no significant
difference from the earlier ADF tests. We also implemented the breakpoint test of Perron and
Vogelsang (1992) in testing the possible existence of structural break(s). The outcome of the tests
is presented in Table 2D with structural break period indicated in the case of each variable. As
shown in the case of each series’ period break, there appears to be no significant issues with the
break timing in all data series. In addition, the series’ break timing provided useful information
for constructing the applied dummy variables.
[INSERT TABLES 2C and 2D HERE]
The Johansen cointegration test (Johansen, 1988) was implemented to understand the long-run
relationships between the variables. In each country’s case, the model estimation is based on the
aforementioned variables, in addition to the dummy applied as an exogenous variable. Table 3
presents the cointegration test results, showing a common pattern of occurrences across countries.
It is also important to note that both the trace and the maximum eigenvalue tests returned at least
four cointegrating equation in the case of each country. These outcomes, therefore, strongly reject
the null hypothesis that there is no cointegration.
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[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE]
The above analysis provides an insight into the practicality and relevance of the VEC specification,
as we have shown the presence of cointegrating vectors and their associated models in examining
banks’ recapitalization. This further helps to understand the short-run dynamics and long-run
economic equilibrium of banking recapitalization. Here, a system of equations in VEC form is
estimated to correct non-stationary errors in the associating macroeconomic variables.
Table 4 presents the results of the VEC model estimates, assuming the presence of (VAR(1))
process. The results are interpreted based on their statistical significance and as such are carried
out with a lot of caution, given the rich set of dynamics in a typical VEC model. Recap variables
lag period in the case of all countries were not significant in explaining all other variables. Only
the lag periods of Spain and U.S. inflation rates were negatively significant in explaining their
respective Recap variables. This point may suggest the two countries’ economic activities have
been negatively impacted by the economic crises periods considered in our data sample. The
dummy variable (DUM) is applied to capture the exogenous effect of the global financial crisis
2007/2008, and the earlier Asian financial crisis of 1997 on the VEC model. There is a significant
relationship in the case of the Nigerian stock index and inflation rate. The DUM lag periods are
positive and significantly associated with the recapitalization variables of Spain and the U.S. This
commonality should be expected as both countries’ recapitalization was in response to the global
financial crisis.
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE]
Table 5 provides the ARDL bounds test results which serve to confirm our VEC outcomes. The
F-statistics confirmed the presence of cointegration among the entire countries’ variables, except
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in the cases of Nigerian industrial production which returned an insignificant outcome. This
position is in conformity with the Johansen cointegration outcome in Table 3, where both the trace
and the maximum tests returned evidence of cointegration among all countries’ variables. From
Table 5, we can see that the recapitalization is negatively significant in determining the Malaysian
lending and inflation rates and also, the Mexican inflation rate. This point may highlight reduction
in lending rate and inflation due to banking recapitalization. Recapitalization negatively
determined Nigerian industrial production, a point which unexpectedly suggests negative
influence of recapitalization on the industrial production. Recapitalization reduces Spain stock
market activities and increases same in the case of the U.S. Generally, the ARDL results are in
conformity with the Johansen and VEC results. This helps to confirm our results, indicating that
there is no problem of outcome agreement among the separate procedures. The above VEC
outcome, as confirmed by the ARDL process, implies that there is cointegration and error
correction among all countries’ macroeconomic variables. These results suggest we could now
proceed to apply our main GFEVD model, its associated IRF and the Toda-Yamamoto to
determine the economic effectiveness of banking recapitalization.
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE]
Table 6 presents the GFEVD results which are based on an autoregressive trend of the data series
and the outcome is divided into panels A, B, C, D and E which represents banking recapitalization
variance decompositions for Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain and the US, respectively. The table
reveals that the Standard Error (SE) of the forecast goes up with increase in the period forecast.
Thus, the SE increases as the relevance of each variable’s lag period in predicting its period ahead
declines. Hence, in order not to lose too much information, decompositions of variables are
presented in each series relating to 8 periods (i.e., 8 quarters) ahead. Again, given the dynamic
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nature of the GFEVD model, a cautious interpretation of outcomes leading to economic relevance
of banking recapitalization is presented from the model.
Throughout the estimated periods and in all of the countries’ panels, recapitalization variables
accounted for the highest number of forecast error variations. However, this degree of dominance
was more in the case of Malaysia, Mexico and Nigeria. In the case of Spain and the US (beginning
from the third period), other variables especially the inflation rate started becoming significant in
accounting for the forecast error.14 These outcomes may underscore the diversified nature of
developed economies, given the changing relevance of their industrial sector with the passage of
time.
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE]
As the main focus of this paper is to understand the effectiveness of banking recapitalization on
the economies of regulation compelled recapitalizing countries, the impulse response function
(IRF) method is implemented. The effect of banking recapitalization is mainly tracked through the
responses of recapitalizing countries’ macroeconomic variables to innovations in recapitalization
variables. Accumulated responses were examined for 40 periods which translates into 10 years of
forecast and which allows the analysis of short-run and long-run effects. Figures 1-5 report the
accumulated impulse responses of recapitalizing countries’ macroeconomic variables to
innovations due to recapitalization.
14 The dominance of banking recapitalization variables of the three developing economies (i.e., Malaysia, Mexico and
Nigeria) included in the sample remained more long lasting in accounting for variations as compared to those of the
developed countries (i.e., Spain and USA).
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Figure 1 explicitly tracks the response of the Malaysian macroeconomic variables to
recapitalization. It can be seen that only stock market index responded to recapitalization with a
steady rise up until the 40th period. Industrial production, as well as lending, exchange and inflation
rates all responded to recapitalization by falling steadily and consistently up until the 40th period.
The falling pattern of inflation rate was steadier in the short-run and long-run. Lending rates
witnessed a faster fall from left to right, both in the short-run and long-run. This is not surprising
as shock to the economy owing to banking recapitalization is expected to lower lending rates.
[INSERT FIGURES 1-5 HERE]
Figure 2 is the accumulated response of Mexico’s macroeconomic variables to innovations due to
banking recapitalization. Stock index, industrial production and exchange rate all responded to
recapitalization with a steady rise, however, the pattern of the rise differs between the three
variables. In the short-run, industrial production responded to banking recapitalization with a sharp
and fast rise. Inflation and lending rates dropped sharply both in the short-run and long-run; these
results are as expected and they validate the findings of the GFEVDs above.
Figure 3 examines the effect of banking recapitalization on Nigeria’s macroeconomic variables.
Stock index, industrial production, as well as lending and inflation rates cumulatively fell in the
short-run through to the long-run as expected. In contrast, the exchange rate had an opposite
reaction to recapitalization as the variable responded with steady rise in the short-run and in the
long-run began to rise disproportionately and never came down. Surprisingly, lending rate fell in
the first four periods and then began to rise sharply in the fifth period, a trend which defers from
other countries’ sample and in defiance of theoretical expectation (Berger and Bouwman, 2013).
Explanation of this difference in reaction may be due to the Nigerian banking system witnessing
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a post-recapitalization period with the creation of toxic and subprime loans usually charged at very
high interest rates. Behavioural issues which flourished due to the lack of effective regulatory
environment may further explain this contrast.
Figure 4 shows the reaction of the Spanish macroeconomic variables to banking recapitalization.
Stock index, industrial production and interest rate responses in the short-run were similar as they
all clustered around zero up to period 4 when they started to rise at different rates through the
long-run. Lending and exchange rates fell down sharply in a similar manner both in the short-run
and long-run. Figure 5 captures the reaction of the U.S. macroeconomic variables to banking
recapitalization. Both stock index and lending rates responded in a similar manner with steady fall
in the short-run and remained same in the long-run. Inflation and exchange rates took a steady rise
in a near similar manner both in the short-run and long-run. Industrial production fell swiftly in
the short-run and attained its lowest point in period 11 before commencing a slow rise through the
long-run. This could be attributed to the saturated nature of the economy with little or no room for
expansion as seen by the initial rise in inflation. Also, the depressed economic condition made
possible by the economic crisis might have contributed.
Table 7 reports the Toda-Yamamoto results which seek to understand the causal effect of
respective variables (i.e., the direction of causality). In panel A, we have the Malaysian results
which shows that the M-Wald test statistics between Malaysian recapitalization and inflation rate
is significant, a result which seems to suggest that recapitalization causes inflation in the
Malaysian economy. This outcome could be expected given that banking recapitalization increases
access to funds to economic agents. Another suggestion may be that the Malaysian economy failed
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to channel the increased capital into productive use. Also, we have significant relationships
between stock index and industrial production; lending rate and stock index; industrial production
and lending rate; exchange rate and stock index; as well as exchange rate and lending rate, with
the first variable usually causing the later. Panel B, Table 7 presents the Mexican results. Banking
recapitalization causes stock market index. While this could be expected given the ability of
banking recapitalization to increase stock market activities through increased capital made
available by banks. Recapitalization also causes exchange rates, an outcome which may suggest
element of capital flight, as economic agents may be borrowing to invest abroad or suggesting that
recapitalization is pushing the economy towards import dependence. We also have a significant
relationship between stock market index and lending rates; stock market index and exchange rate;
lending rates and industrial production; lending rates and exchange rates; as well as industrial
production and stock index.
The case of Nigeria is presented in Panel C Table 7 where we found recapitalization not to cause
any of the macroeconomic variables as we fail to find any significant relationship. However, we
found causality running from stock exchange to recapitalization, industrial production and
exchange rate variables. Panel D Table 7 presents Span results, where we found causal
relationships running from recapitalization to industrial production, exchange rate and inflation
rate, thus suggesting banking recapitalization causing the later variables. On the opposite site, we
found recapitalization being caused by lending rates, industrial production and exchange rates.
Finally, Panel E Table 7 has the US results which suggests that recapitalization causes stock index,
lending rates, industrial production and exchange rates. These results should be expected as
recapitalization tends to influence the major macroeconomic activity of the US economy.
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[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE]
In summary, the economic effectiveness of banking recapitalization, examined through the
GFEVDs and IRF models in addition to the T-Y procedure, shows consistent results in both
models. A significant finding in both models is the similarity of reactions in macroeconomic
variables of developing economies on the one hand and for developed economies on the other. For
the developing economies of Malaysia, Mexico and Nigeria, a common feature is noted with
regards to the reaction of their industrial production to banking recapitalization. This relates to the
existence of spare capacity, which should lead to expansive investment activities, leveraging on
the resulting falling lending rates. As for the developed economies of Spain and the U.S.,
notwithstanding the absence of spare capacity, banking recapitalization effects resulted in
providing them with an opportunity to stabilize their banking system and the economy in general.
6. Implications and Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the wider economic effectiveness of banking recapitalization
through the reactions of macroeconomic variables in five economies. Our findings show that the
macroeconomic variables in these economies have reacted to banking recapitalization in similar
manner. However, the similarities reflect different divides, with a prominence of similar behaviour
for macroeconomic variables of developed countries on the one hand, and also, a similar behaviour
for the variables of developing countries on the other hand. In this instance, we found that all of
the developing economies in the sample responded to recapitalization with a rise in industrial
production. However, in the case of the developed economies, there was a fall in industrial
production. Specifically, while many similarities were found in the reaction of the USA and
Spanish variables to banking recapitalization, yet, the variables of Malaysia, Mexico and Nigeria
were found to exhibit similar reactions to each other.
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These findings have implications for the literature on banking recapitalization, and for banks
operating in different international business environments. For example, banking recapitalization,
which mainly operates on the basis of meeting up with capital adequacy requirement as stipulated
in the Basel accords (Bank for International Settlements, 1988; 2001; 2011; 2013), is thought to
improve banks’ resilience to risk. This is expected to ultimately enhance the efficient discharge of
the financial intermediation role of the banking sector. One of the findings of this paper is the
ability of banking recapitalization to lower banks’ lending rates in all examined economies. While
this outcome is expected, it should be equated with a similar capacity to borrow and invest for
efficient economic impact. In relation to this, all developing economies in the sample responded
to recapitalization with a rise in industrial production. However, in the case of the developed
economies, there was a fall in industrial production. While these occurrences may be attributed to
the comparative spare capacity of the developing economies, the developed economies could
equally be reacting to the reduction in economic activities due to economic crisis. This is given
that our data sample covered financial and economic crises periods, i.e., the 1997 Asian financial
crisis and the 2007-2008 global financial and macroeconomic crises.
Therefore, this paper has succeeded in highlighting how crucial a strong capital is to the survival
of the banking system of both developed and developing countries, during normal and crisis times.
One insight that has become more apparent, in the case of the developing countries in our sample,
is the potential lack of accompanying regulatory support in the aftermath of recapitalization. For
instance, the Nigerian lending rates reacted to recapitalization with a continuous rise, as the
country experienced the creation of large scale subprime loans attributable to (irrational)
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behavioral tendencies. This may be connected to the behavioral findings relating to the post-
banking recapitalization era in both Malaysian and Mexican economies as Sufian and Habibullah
(2013) and Maudos and Solís (2011), respectively, found. This may further imply that a review of
the regulatory framework, with increased emphasis on supervision and good corporate governance
practice should accompany bank recapitalization.
Another salient concern which may precipitate behavioural issues is connected to the gap in the
implementation of the Basel regulations. For instance, the Basel III (Bank for International
Settlements, 2011; 2013) is not coming into effect as a replacement of the existing Basel II until
2019. This may suggest that the Basel regulatory standards are catch-up tools, which are at best
reactionary than proactive. Given the scale of behavioral issues especially surfacing in the
aftermath of banking recapitalization, as evident in this study, it is important to point here that
recapitalization alone may not necessarily provide the solution to risk-based problems. Managerial
competence, discipline, increased surveillance, good corporate governance practice and
coordinated institutional regulation are equally important. A further finding in this paper is that
banking recapitalization motivated by market forces produces a different outcome to the one
forced by regulators. Recapitalization carried out based on market expectations will have the
tendency to influence economic activities through increased demand for loans. However,
regulation compelled recapitalization may encourage behavioural issues.
Future studies should recognize this divide and examine the outcome of each effect on the
economy. Other alternatives may be to study the reactions of economies with expected similar
traits to banking recapitalization. For example, international business scholars may examine bank
29
recapitalization in major emerging economies such as; Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Africa, Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey, with a consideration of their economic integration
potentials in extending the current paper. Also, similarities among developed countries under
suitable common criteria like the G7 and OECD economies among others could be explored.
We provide implications for international business research, practice and policy by highlighting
the need for countries adopting the Basel capital adequacy framework to pay attention to the state
of their economies, the supporting regulatory mechanisms (in place to check behavioural issues)
and their comparative spare capacities. This is not only important for policy makers but also
international businesses occupying multiple regulatory spaces in the global banking system.
Unlike prior studies which mainly focussed on individual countries, our data has an international
spread, which enables us to contribute a comparative perspective to the examination of the wider
economic implication of banking recapitalization on the productive sector.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Country Series Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev.
RECAP 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.28
MASIt 1041.36 952.72 1882.71 373.52 411.10
MAIPt 78.95 80.90 124.80 28.60 27.69
Malaysia MALRt 7.10 6.72 12.27 5.51 1.24
MAIRt 2.81 2.86 8.40 -2.28 1.44
MAERt 3.30 3.31 4.45 2.44 0.52
RECAP 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27
MESIt 19003.29 12676.90 45881.08 1832.83 15542.00
MEIPt 91.29 92.86 108.10 65.37 11.85
Mexico MELRt 13.91 8.11 71.02 3.30 13.44
MEIRt 9.23 4.77 48.70 2.28 9.86
MEERt 79.81 77.54 126.43 57.29 12.27
RECAP 0.10 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.30
NSIt 210.61 188.75 749.32 49.71 153.11
NIPt 4693167.00 142071.40 18745360.00 88137.80 7143162.00
Nigeria NLRt 18.60 17.85 26.25 13.86 2.51
NIRt 12.02 10.72 47.25 -3.13 9.07
NERt 130.05 130.05 199.26 75.72 30.78
RECAP 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27
SSIt 778.69 828.14 1691.55 204.75 383.86
SIPt 105.31 100.64 128.05 86.03 12.44
Spain SLRt 6.19 4.92 14.93 3.02 3.46
SIRt 3.26 3.27 7.00 -1.07 1.70
SERt 133.77 128.85 191.60 95.02 22.84
RECAP 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.27
USSIt 9519.46 10305.96 17929.99 2452.48 4267.35
USIPt 89.78 94.29 106.28 63.08 13.54
USA USLRt 14.32 13.60 18.28 11.82 2.05
USIRt 2.51 2.65 6.22 -1.62 1.30
USERt 1.65 1.61 2.04 1.42 0.15
Notes: MA, ME, N, S and US represent Malaysia, Mexico, Nigeria, Spain and USA
respectively. Stock Market Indices, Lending Rates, Industrial Production, Exchange Rates and
Inflation Rates are respectively represented with the following acronyms: SI, LR, IP, ER and
IR. MASI, MALR, MAIP, MAER and MAIR; MESI, MELR, MEIP, MEER and MEIR; NSI,
NLR, NIP, NER and NIR; SSI, SLR, SIP, SER and SIR; USSI, USLR, USIP, USER and
USIR, represent the respective countries under consideration with the corresponding variable.
See footnote 12 for the explanation of RECAP variable construction.
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Table 2A: ADF Test (Intercept and trend)
Test at Levels Test at First Differences
Country Series
Lag
length
ADF
t-stat Series
Lag
length
ADF
t-stat
MASIt 0 -2.3095 ∆MASIt 0 -10.748**
MAIPt 0 -2.4643 ∆MAIPt 5 -5.5676**
Malaysia MALRt 3 -3.3759 ∆MALRt 1 -7.6381**
MAIRt 4 -3.1797** ∆MAIRt N/A N/A
MAERt 0 -1.7381 ∆MAERt 0 -9.8811**
MESIt 1 -2.2423 ∆MESIt 1 -7.9313**
MEIPt 1 -2.8261 ∆MEIPt 0 -5.7539**
Mexico MELRt 10 -1.7508 ∆MELRt 11 -7.7125**
MEIRt 1 -4.2383** ∆MEIRt N/A N/A
MEERt 0 -2.5088 ∆MEERt 0 -10.126**
NSIt 4 -1.7570 ∆NSIt 3 -5.2269**
NIPt 0 -1.8208 ∆NIPt 0 -8.8130**
Nigeria NLRt 0 -1.8254 ∆NLRt 0 -8.0803**
NIRt 2 -4.5601** ∆NIRt N/A N/A
NERt 0 0.4331 ∆NERt 0 -5.0664**
SSIt 1 -2.0553 ∆SSIt 0 -7.4503**
SIPt 1 -1.4099 ∆SIPt 0 -5.2236**
Spain SLRt 1 -2.9597 ∆SLRt 3 -6.1584**
SIRt 1 -3.5467* ∆SIRt N/A N/A
SERt 1 -2.0219 ∆SERt 0 -7.7094**
USSIt 4 -2.301 ∆USSIt 0 -10.353**
USIPt 1 -2.3404 ∆USIPt 1 -4.708**
USA USLRt 0 -1.7451 ∆USLRt 0 -8.6265**
USIRt 5 -3.9847 ∆USIRt 4 -5.1854**
USERt 2 -2.3630 ∆USERt 1 -8.8911**
Notes: Variables on the left panel are presented in levels whereas the variables on the right
panel are presented in first differences. Tests (including lag length) were determined based on
Schwarz information criteria (SC). The asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 5%
level, ** indicates statistical significance at the 1% level. N/A refers to ‘not applicable’, and it
is being used to indicate that the test is not necessary as the variable is already stationary at
level. Recapitalization (RECAP) unit root was also tested in the instances of all countries, they
were found to be nonstationary at level and stationary at first difference. See also notes in
Table 1.
Table 2B: P-P Test (Intercept and trend)
Test at Levels Test at First Differences
Country Series
Band-
width
P-P
t-stat Series
Band-
width
P-P
t-stat
MASIt 2 -2.3343 ∆MASIt 2 -10.742**
MAIPt 6 -2.4093 ∆MAIPt 5 -10.328**
Malaysia MALRt 4 -2.8530 ∆MALRt 2 -7.2534**
MAIRt 22 -3.0770* ∆MAIRt N/A N/A
MAERt 1 -1.7761 ∆MASIt 2 -9.8903**
MESIt 5 -1.9708 ∆MESIt 11 -8.1499**
MEIPt 3 -2.2216 ∆MEIPt 2 -5.8267**
Mexico MELRt 4 -3.7441 ∆MELRt 3 -9.8391**
MEIRt 0 -1.9983 ∆MEIRt 18 -4.2246**
MEERt 4 -2.7701 ∆MEERt 1 -4.7867**
NSIt 5 -1.9901 ∆NSIt 5 -6.3377**
NIPt 0 -1.8208 ∆NIPt 2 -8.8040**
Nigeria NLRt 4 -2.2123 ∆NLRt 4 -8.1832**
NIRt 4 -4.4975** ∆NIRt N/A N/A
NERt 3 1.0281 ∆NERt 2 -4.8007**
SSIt 4 -1.9781 ∆SSIt 1 -7.4529**
SIPt 5 -2.1902 ∆SIPt 3 -5.3604**
Spain SLRt 4 -2.3126 ∆SLRt 6 -5.4084**
SIRt 10 -2.6233 ∆SIRt 33 -8.2589**
SERt 2 -1.7471 ∆SERt 4 -7.6693**
USSIt 4 -2.301 ∆USSIt 2 -10.352**
USIPt 5 -1.4975 ∆USIPt 6 -3.8848*
USA USLRt 4 -2.2385 ∆USLRt 4 -8.7463**
USIRt 32 -2.8932 ∆USIRt 34 -10.751**
USERt 4 -2.4449 ∆USERt 15 -7.3949**
Notes: Tests bandwidth was determined based on Newey-West estimator. All other provisions
are same as Table 2A.
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Table 2C: KPSS Test (Intercept and trend)
Test at Levels Test at First Differences
Country Series
Band-
Width
KPSS
t-stat Series
Band-
width
ADF
t-stat
MASIt 8 0.2159 ∆MASIt 3 0.0420**
MAIPt 8 0.2048 ∆MAIPt 5 0.0414**
Malaysia MALRt 8 0.1000 ∆MALRt 3 0.0561**
MAIRt 4 0.1180** ∆MAIRt N/A N/A
MAERt 8 0.1984 ∆MAERt 2 0.0848**
MESIt 8 0.2815 ∆MESIt 7 0.0629**
MEIPt 7 0.1175 ∆MEIPt 3 0.0382**
Mexico MELRt 6 0.1616 ∆MELRt 3 0.0420**
MEIRt 7 0.0929* ∆MEIRt N/A N/A
MEERt 8 0.1531 ∆MEERt 3 0.0328**
NSIt 6 0.1621 ∆NSIt 4 0.0476**
NIPt 6 0.2673 ∆NIPt 2 0.0660**
Nigeria NLRt 6 0.1161 ∆NLRt 4 0.0575**
NIRt 5 0.0445** ∆NIRt N/A N/A
NERt 6 1.2283 ∆NERt 1 0.3932**
SSIt 7 0.1636 ∆SSIt 3 0.0578**
SIPt 9 0.2538 ∆SIPt 5 0.0841**
Spain SLRt 9 0.2695 ∆SLRt 4 0.0425**
SIRt 7 0.1196 ∆SIRt 17 0.1278
SERt 8 0.2000 ∆SERt 3 0.1093
USSIt 8 0.1080 ∆USSIt 2 0.0605**
USIPt 8 0.2544 ∆USIPt 5 0.0560**
USA USLRt 8 0.1826 ∆USLRt 4 0.0334**
USIRt 5 0.0988* ∆USIRt N/A N/A
USERt 8 0.1087 ∆USERt 9 0.0571**
Notes: Tests bandwidth was determined based on Newey-West estimator. See also notes
in Table 2A.
Table 2D: Breakpoint Test (Intercept Only)
Test at Levels Test at First Differences
Country Series
ADF
t-stat
Break
period Series
ADF
t-stat
Break
period
MASIt -3.4838 2009Q1 ∆MASIt -11.2711** 1997Q3
MAIPt -2.2362 1999Q1 ∆MAIPt -11.0564** 2009Q1
Malaysia MALRt -6.2611** 1998Q1 ∆MALRt N/A N/A
MAIRt -5.2851** 1998Q3 ∆MAIRt N/A N/A
MAERt -3.9064 1997Q2 ∆MAERt 12.2728** 1997Q4
MESIt -2.3709 2005Q2 ∆MESIt -8.7688** 2008Q3
MEIPt -2.1950 1996Q3 ∆MEIPt -6.4735** 2009Q1
Mexico MELRt -4.3072* 1998Q4 ∆MELRt N/A N/A
MEIRt -5.0234** 1999Q1 ∆MEIRt N/A N/A
MEERt -5.1622** 1995Q1 ∆MEERt N/A N/A
NSIt -2.9942 2009Q2 ∆NSIt -6.2146** 2007Q4
NIPt -18.331** 2009Q4 ∆NIPt N/A N/A
Nigeria NLRt -3.7514 2002Q3 ∆NLRt -9.2214** 2002Q4
NIRt -6.0694** 2005Q2 ∆NIRt N/A N/A
NERt -0.4990 2014Q3 ∆NERt -8.8570** 2016Q1
SSIt -2.9043 1996Q3 ∆SSIt -8.2547** 2008Q4
SIPt -2.4336 2007Q4 ∆SIPt -7.4805** 2008Q4
Spain SLRt -5.0327** 1995Q4 ∆SLRt N/A N/A
SIRt -3.7976 2008Q3 ∆SIRt -8.2801** 2008Q4
SERt -2.6218 2001Q2 ∆SERt -8.1032** 2002Q3
USSIt -2.1073 2009Q1 ∆USSIt -11.2355** 2008Q4
USIPt -2.8615 1996Q1 ∆USIPt -5.7407** 2009Q1
USA USLRt -3.6758 2000Q4 ∆USLRt -9.1760** 2003Q1
USIRt -5.4147** 2008Q3 ∆USIRt N/A N/A
USERt -3.1907 2009Q2 ∆USERt -10.3507** 2008Q4
Notes: See also notes in Table 2A.
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Table 3: Cointegration Tests
Panel A: Trace Test Panel B: Max-Eigenvalue Test
Country
ࡴ૙
ࣅܜܚ܉܋܍
Stat
5%
C.V. p-value ࡴ૙
ࣅܕ ܉ܠ
Stat
5%
C.V. p-value
None * 278.27 150.56 0.0000 None * 82.02 50.60 0.0000
At most 1 * 196.25 117.71 0.0000 At most 1 * 56.09 44.50 0.0019
At most 2 * 140.16 88.80 0.0000 At most 2 * 51.40 38.33 0.0010
Malaysia At most 3 * 88.76 63.88 0.0001 At most 3 * 37.48 32.12 0.0100
At most 4 * 51.28 42.92 0.0059 At most 4 * 30.46 25.82 0.0114
At most 5 20.82 25.87 0.1872 At most 5 10.72 19.39 0.5420
At most 6 10.098 12.58 0.1228 At most 6 10.10 12.52 0.1228
None * 618.14 150.55 0.0001 None * 182.75 50.599 0.0000
At most 1 * 435.38 117.70 0.0000 At most 1 * 155.83 44.497 0.0000
At most 2 * 279.54 88.803 0.0000 At most 2 * 121.42 38.331 0.0000
Mexico At most 3 * 158.12 63.876 0.0000 At most 3 * 71.524 32.118 0.0000
At most 4 * 86.602 42.915 0.0000 At most 4 * 49.946 25.823 0.0000
At most 5 * 36.656 25.872 0.0016 At most 5 * 24.312 19.387 0.0088
At most 6 12.343 12.517 0.0535 At most 6 12.343 12.517 0.0535
None * 711.05 125.62 0.0001 None * 221.21 46.23 0.0000
At most 1 * 489.84 95.75 0.0001 At most 1 * 209.15 40.08 0.0001
At most 2 * 280.69 69.82 0.0000 At most 2 * 111.55 33.88 0.0000
Nigeria At most 3 * 169.14 47.86 0.0000 At most 3 * 79.77 27.58 0.0000
At most 4 * 89.37 29.80 0.0000 At most 4 * 67.31 21.13 0.0000
At most 5 * 22.07 15.49 0.0044 At most 5 * 18.80 14.26 0.0089
At most 6 3.26 3.84 0.0710 At most 6 3.26 3.84 0.0710
None * 365.61 125.62 0.0000 None * 124.36 46.23 0.0000
At most 1 * 241.25 95.75 0.0000 At most 1 * 88.76 40.08 0.0000
At most 2 * 152.49 69.82 0.0000 At most 2 * 69.46 33.88 0.0000
Spain At most 3 * 83.02 47.86 0.0000 At most 3 * 40.15 27.58 0.0007
At most 4 * 42.87 29.80 0.0009 At most 4 * 24.69 21.13 0.0151
At most 5 * 18.18 15.49 0.0192 At most 5 * 17.97 14.26 0.0124
At most 6 0.22 3.84 0.6417 At most 6 0.22 3.84 0.6417
None * 326.66 150.56 2.3E-18 None * 108.22 50.60 3.5E-09
At most 1 * 218.44 117.71 3.3E-14 At most 1 * 69.87 44.50 1.4E-05
At most 2 * 148.57 88.80 2.2E-08 At most 2 * 50.31 38.33 1.4E-03
USA At most 3 * 98.25 63.88 6.7E-06 At most 3 * 40.97 32.12 3.2E-03
At most 4 * 57.28 42.92 1.0E-03 At most 4 * 30.19 25.82 1.2E-02
At most 5 * 27.09 25.87 3.5E-02 At most 5 16.50 19.39 1.3E-01
At most 6 10.59 12.52 1.0E-01 At most 6 10.59 12.52 1.0E-01
Notes; Co-integration tests model is based on each country’s data series and recapitalization (RECAP) variable in addition
to the dummy (DUM) applied as exogenous variable. The asterisk * indicates presence of co-integrating equation at the
5% level for both the trace and max-eigenvalue tests. λmax tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors
is “r” against the alternative hypothesis of “r+1”. λtrace tests the null hypothesis that the number of cointegrating vectors is
equal to or less than “r” against the alternative hypothesis of “>r”. C.V. stands for critical value.
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Table 4: Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) Estimates
Country ∆RECAPt ∆MASIt ∆MAIPt ∆MALRt ∆MAIRt ∆MAERt
Malaysia
∆RECAPt-1 [-0.04583] [0.29313] [-0.17689] [0.17569] [0.46224] [0.03129]
∆MASIt-1 [0.01320] [-2.05671]* [-0.15134] [0.35561] [-0.63635] [-1.37698]
∆MAIPt-1 [-1.00361] [-0.34832] [-1.29558] [0.27635] [-0.42628] [-0.17243]
∆MALRt-1 [-0.29413] [-2.05358]* [-0.11713] [2.31251]* [0.51327] [0.92686]
∆MAIRt-1 [0.14583] [-3.17035]* [-1.19089] [0.63464] [4.78163]* [0.93684]
∆MAERt-1 [0.09393] [-0.54538] [-0.35994] [-0.39934] [-0.65369] [-0.94499]
DUM [-0.07770] [-3.35778]* [-2.30883]* [-0.40597] [1.63907] [2.54983]*
∆RECAPt ∆MESIt ∆MEIPt ∆MELRt ∆MEIRt ∆MEERt
Mexico
∆RECAPt-1 [-0.32175] [0.03355] [-0.72917] [-0.54872] [0.11704] [0.09957]
∆MESIt-1 [-1.13121] [1.98780]* [2.92809]* [-0.34103] [0.12991] [-1.64849]
∆MEIPt-1 [-0.58846] [0.11761] [2.42997]* [-0.06066] [-1.80635] [-0.68064]
∆MELRt-1 [-0.25645] [-1.47082] [2.89073]* [-3.05575]* [-3.27035]* [-2.62724]*
∆MEIRt-1 [-0.05276] [-0.57335] [2.15518]* [-2.24477]* [2.82062]* [-0.67454]
∆MEERt-1 [-0.06021] [1.43112] [-1.59683] [3.38726]* [3.64956]* [1.54253]
DUM [1.58186] [-0.28657] [-0.93471] [0.03168] [-0.30843] [-0.35388]
 ∆RECAPt ∆NSIt ∆NIPt ∆NLRt ∆NIRt ∆NERt
Nigeria
∆RECAPt-1 [0.49623] [-0.92264] [ 0.48755] [-0.79777] [5.57162] [-0.32796]
∆NSIt-1 [0.14697] [1.98736]* [-0.94523] [-1.95098] [1.18624] [-2.66046]*
∆NIPt-1 [0.10834] [-1.11724] [0.19984]* [0.10243] [0.64146] [0.37103]
∆NLRt-1 [0.08261] [-1.05777] [0.93014] [0.55353] [0.96073] [1.08010]
∆NIRt-1 [0.90727] [0.13893] [0.30941] [0.92853] [0.82327] [0.06315]
∆NERt-1 [-0.33778] [0.57877] [-1.33814] [0.41297] [-0.20402] [-1.44853]
DUM [-0.55872] [-2.05080]* [-1.82484] [0.88026] [-2.81106]* [0.22151]
 ∆RECAPt ∆SSIt ∆SIPt ∆SLRt ∆SIRt ∆SERt
Spain
∆RECAPt-1 [-0.99012] [1.18187] [-1.67045] [0.05760] [-0.22596] [-1.56367]
∆SSIt-1 [0.48423] [1.01753] [3.24943]* [0.27712] [0.02388] [0.03662]
∆SIPt-1 [0.27962] [3.46181]* [5.06268]* [1.36141] [2.67281]* [-0.66555]
∆SLRt-1 [0.03075] [-1.01815] [-0.37167] [4.87735]* [-0.56391] [-0.64453]
∆SIRt-1 [-2.00520]* [-3.54643]* [-1.88725] [-0.22958] [1.83290] [-0.74901]
∆SERt-1 [-0.45637] [-0.32461] [0.03801] [-0.37685] [-1.15285] [1.75842]
DUM [5.69071]* [-1.80032] [-1.85565] [0.59347] [-0.83059] [0.27882]
 ∆RECAPt ∆USSIt ∆USIPt ∆USLRt ∆USIRt ∆USERt
USA
∆RECAPt-1 [-0.98666] [0.52671] [-1.18618] [-0.44997] [1.64088] [1.22094]
∆USSIt-1 [-1.04880] [-1.38928] [2.91549]* [-0.32880] [0.36043] [-0.05238]
∆USIPt-1 [-1.20966] [2.29551]* [8.84390]* [0.49751] [3.78202]* [2.12412]*
∆USLRt-1 [-0.97037] [1.03146] [0.49443] [0.86099] [0.65031] [1.22750]
∆USIRt-1 [-2.52887]* [-1.63542] [0.04018] [-1.07327] [1.25868] [-2.32986]*
∆USERt-1 [1.55760] [1.68435] [1.24200] [-1.09661] [2.28754]* [2.56555]*
DUM [5.40527]* [-1.59552] [-1.42053] [0.01033] [-2.37722]* [-1.58850]
Notes: The asterisk * indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. See also notes in Table 1.
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Table 5: ARDL Bounds Test results for the long-run coefficients
Panel A (Malaysia). Dependent variables
RECAP LMASI LMALR LMAIP LMAER LMAIR
ECT -0.72009*** -0.43378*** -0.35111*** -0.12413*** -0.26056*** -0.61168***
DUM 0.07392 -0.41631*** 0.13438*** 0.04857 -0.04196 0.25454*
RECAP - -0.09686 -0.30277*** 0.51932 0.07405 -0.50526**
LMASI 0.06201 - -0.17494 0.88653*** -0.29830*** 0.09054
LMALR -0.22223 0.06509 - 1.93809 0.86024*** 0.81519**
LMAIP -0.55828*** 1.31128*** 0.05822 - 0.70464*** -0.27344
LMAER 0.22500 -2.14279*** -0.36815 0.76673 - -0.42605
LMAIR -0.64622*** 0.15640* -0.08494 -0.47759* -0.03990 -
F-statistic 3.60** 6.89*** 6.64*** 8.54*** 4.22*** 6.59***
R2 0.4695 0.5809 0.7353 0.7894 0.5098 0.3569
Panel B (Mexico). Dependent variables
RECAP LMESI LMELR LMEIP LMEER LMEIR
ECT -0.47378*** -0.55648*** -0.07118*** -0.35430*** -0.56131*** -0.24635***
DUM 0.55361*** -0.03021 -1.16690 0.13941 0.09694 0.62175***
RECAP - 0.33601 -5.28122 -0.09514 0.01546 -0.94469**
LMESI 0.18265*** - 8.45702 0.14648*** 0.10722 0.08779
LMELR 0.16766** 0.19305 - -0.12060** -0.08270 0.73827***
LMEIP -0.93466* 4.57880*** -36.91101 - -1.24941*** -1.38635
LMEER -0.06420 2.87776*** -0.04235 -1.01097** - 0.93500
LMEIR -0.17648*** -0.99084*** 6.99697 0.20628** 0.03825 -
F-statistic 11.06*** 6.04*** 3.52** 6.55*** 3.94** 3.44**
R2 0.5568 0.7266 0.9481 0.9746 0.8992 0.8521
Panel C (Nigeria). Dependent variables
RECAP LNSI LNLR LNIP LNER LNIR
ECT -0.86318*** -0.46714*** -0.08400*** -0.09668** -1.56345*** -0.49605***
DUM -0.18090** -0.26980 0.08960 -0.96179 -0.04770 1.02009**
RECAP - -1.83961 0.22922 -3.26329* 0.10635 -1.33342
LNSI -0.24089* - -0.57952 -0.53893 0.17347*** -1.90534**
LNLR -1.64605*** -1.94164 - -8.70401* 1.26418** -9.90326**
LNIP -0.17827*** -0.39771** 0.06466 - 0.09232*** -0.65685**
LNER 1.32138*** 4.32697*** -0.17003 7.07325*** - 8.88496***
LNIR 0.06640 0.19883 -0.43656 0.38878 -0.01008 -
F-statistic 5.01*** 5.78*** 3.71** 1.02 16.48*** 5.86***
R2 0.8432 0.9497 0.8054 0.1023 0.9979 0.8756
Panel D (Spain). Dependent variables
RECAP LSSI LSLR LSIP LSER LSIR
ECT -0.61939*** -0.35311*** -0.00204*** -0.03901*** -0.42090*** -0.30771***
DUM 0.63603*** 0.39383*** -54.75840 -0.21825 -0.02379 0.99164
RECAP - 0.85891** 56.56494 0.55280 -0.03508 -1.07974
LSSI -0.19535 - 57.83870 -0.44750 0.35526* -2.27934**
LSLR 0.20098* -0.46904*** - -0.39170 -0.03804 -0.09079
LSIP 0.64607* -0.05184 -78.10339 - 0.37778 16.90725***
LSER 0.05140 2.20238*** -79.49320 1.57139* - -4.15765**
LSIR -0.21539*** -0.27221*** 29.34184 0.03156 0.30119** -
F-statistic 11.29*** 6.86*** 4.49*** 4.90*** 5.11*** 4.86***
R2 0.8422 0.8331 0.7563 0.8461 0.9296 0.6067
Panel E (USA). Dependent variables
RECAP LUSSI LUSLR LUSIP LUSER LUSIR
ECT -0.34850*** -0.16495*** -0.01378*** -0.13154*** -0.19276*** -0.99586***
DUM 0.43350*** 0.26045 3.57630 0.06347 0.21537** -0.38536**
RECAP - -0.54782* -10.52071 -0.18666* -0.59783*** 0.67940**
LUSSI -0.14406 - -1.13706 0.15772** -0.91326*** -1.05721**
LUSLR -0.95489*** -1.11896 - -0.27647 -0.66017* 2.18331***
LUSIP -0.09880 2.06543** -5.15915 - 2.70746*** 3.95517**
LUSER 0.52674* -0.83157 -3.24697 0.48110** - 1.62894***
LUSIR 0.10164* 0.02433 -0.40343 0.02734 0.03696 -
F-statistic 9.02*** 3.39** 5.59*** 5.29*** 5.28*** 4.27***
R2 0.6122 0.2285 0.7852 0.9482 0.7025 0.5055
Notes: The asterisk *** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. ECT is the error correction term which is obtained
from the cointegrating form that also shows the short-term parameters. The other parameters in this table are for the long-term effects. In all cases, ECT is
significant and negative as required. F-statistic is for the Bounds test; the absence of any asterisk means that there is either no cointegration or we do not have
conclusive evidence, otherwise we reject the null hypothesis that there is no long-run relationship. The critical I(0) [I(1)] values for the Bounds test are 2.08
[3.00], 2.39 [3.38] and 3.06 [4.15] for the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. See also notes in Table 1.
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Table 6: Generalised Forecast Error Variance Decomposition Results
Panel A: Malaysia Panel B: Mexico
Period S.E. RECAP MASI MAIP MALR MAIR MAER S.E. RECAP MESI MEIP MELR MEIR MEER
1 0.1449 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1530 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.2056 99.43 0.01 0.47 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.2124 98.89 0.91 0.12 0.07 0.01 0.00
3 0.2517 99.27 0.01 0.53 0.05 0.13 0.00 0.2595 97.93 1.73 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.01
4 0.2905 99.12 0.01 0.56 0.06 0.24 0.01 0.2992 97.29 2.25 0.36 0.04 0.05 0.01
5 0.3247 99.01 0.02 0.57 0.07 0.32 0.01 0.3343 96.87 2.59 0.41 0.03 0.08 0.01
6 0.3556 98.94 0.02 0.58 0.07 0.38 0.01 0.3660 96.60 2.81 0.44 0.03 0.10 0.02
7 0.3840 98.90 0.02 0.58 0.08 0.41 0.01 0.3951 96.44 2.96 0.45 0.02 0.11 0.02
8 0.4105 98.87 0.02 0.59 0.09 0.43 0.01 0.4222 96.32 3.06 0.46 0.02 0.12 0.02
Panel C: Nigeria Panel D: Spain
Period S.E. RECAP NSI NIP NLR NIR NER S.E. RECAP SSI SIP SLR SIR SER
1 0.1657 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.1200 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.2314 99.77 0.03 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.02 0.1466 96.78 2.14 0.02 0.02 1.00 0.04
3 0.2772 99.39 0.04 0.28 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.1722 87.33 4.90 0.72 0.15 6.85 0.05
4 0.3100 98.70 0.03 0.59 0.56 0.08 0.04 0.2006 74.15 8.16 2.57 0.44 14.58 0.09
5 0.3364 97.87 0.03 0.91 0.94 0.17 0.08 0.2317 62.16 11.28 5.06 0.84 20.53 0.14
6 0.3592 97.06 0.03 1.20 1.30 0.29 0.12 0.2629 53.10 14.03 7.47 1.29 23.93 0.18
7 0.3800 96.38 0.03 1.43 1.60 0.40 0.15 0.2928 46.70 16.33 9.47 1.73 25.56 0.21
8 0.3997 95.83 0.04 1.61 1.85 0.49 0.18 0.3205 42.21 18.20 11.02 2.13 26.21 0.22
Panel E: USA
Period S.E. RECAP USSI USIP USLR USIR USER
1 0.1147 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2 0.1434 95.96 0.39 0.29 1.89 0.22 1.25
3 0.1686 89.28 0.39 0.61 3.52 4.62 1.58
4 0.1944 81.64 0.30 0.48 4.49 11.02 2.07
5 0.2198 74.98 0.30 0.53 4.89 16.53 2.77
6 0.2441 69.56 0.53 1.09 4.94 20.34 3.55
7 0.2673 65.18 0.95 2.12 4.80 22.65 4.30
8 0.2894 61.66 1.48 3.40 4.58 23.90 4.97
Notes: Variables for all countries are based on Cholesky ordering and are respectively based on: Banking recapitalization, Stock market indices, Industrial
production, Lending rates, Inflation and Exchange rates (RECAP, SI, IP, LR, IR, ER). See notes in Table 1 for the definition of the variables.
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Table 7: Toda Yamamoto (T-Y) procedure for Granger causality
Panel A (Malaysia). Dependent variables
RECAP LMASI LMALR LMAIP LMAER LMAIR
RECAP - 4.13236 6.61176 7.14548 1.60917 10.85870*
LMASI 0.37907 - 2.07536 21.1076*** 1.33033 1.86495
LMALR 3.02836 27.1675*** - 6.33590 7.63983 6.26956
LMAIP 1.35612 8.02974 14.0723** - 4.98145 5.32511
LMAER 0.48710 22.4280*** 17.8671*** 7.88175 - 1.19573
LMAIR 4.65323 7.17492 9.27062* 5.22405 9.99498* -
Panel B (Mexico). Dependent variables
RECAP LMESI LMELR LMEIP LMEER LMEIR
RECAP - 10.8832* 3.80385 9.78369 11.1126* 6.86133
LMESI 6.91732 - 12.2838** 9.14194 11.3247* 9.23310
LMELR 5.47333 5.50462 - 14.9321** 14.6757** 7.90842
LMEIP 8.05011 17.9365*** 3.80203 - 2.24399 7.49692
LMEER 5.39719 5.94155 8.45266 3.84747 - 20.6929***
LMEIR 2.31881 9.50225 4.35414 3.20243 2.55983 -
Panel C (Nigeria). Dependent variables
RECAP LNSI LNLR LNIP LNER LNIR
RECAP - 3.16058 0.86010 2.14256 0.56960 1.82657
LNSI 4.65649* - 2.16113 4.09492* 7.94846** 2.94388
LNLR 1.64502 2.67084 - 2.03233 2.01471 1.16932
LNIP 0.23746 0.76062 5.39239* - 0.15429 2.12860
LNER 0.50028 1.71664 3.91797 0.65906 - 2.53498
LNIR 3.39738 1.01681 0.62764 0.34743 0.53665 -
Panel D (Spain). Dependent variables
RECAP LSSI LSLR LSIP LSER LSIR
RECAP - 3.80201 4.22609 21.8679*** 13.3547* 26.2223***
LSSI 10.4463 - 13.8791* 8.08399 1.92731 17.6108**
LSLR 39.1149*** 13.6971* - 4.32967 8.77125 5.56774
LSIP 31.0438*** 3.56028 7.98673 - 5.89869 13.4670*
LSER 20.3932*** 5.15461 8.32314 7.75401 - 6.66378
LSIR 13.7133* 9.14140 7.67445 3.54163 13.0361* -
Panel E (USA). Dependent variables
RECAP LUSSI LUSLR LUSIP LUSER LUSIR
RECAP - 19.1293** 14.6112* 31.5527*** 28.8800*** 8.76400
LUSSI 13.2686* - 4.91812 14.1926* 20.0668** 9.50365
LUSLR 6.11412 6.59257 - 18.6797** 15.9755* 7.35828
LUSIP 15.4778* 11.2742 10.7370 - 43.9053*** 14.6394*
LUSER 10.3744 12.1613 10.2330 10.5717 - 10.9003
LUSIR 9.62552 6.53495 15.1967* 3.76935 7.09693 -
Notes: The asterisk *** (**) (*) indicates statistical significance (i.e., presence of causality) at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels,
respectively. We report the M-Wald statistic that has χ2 distribution.  See also notes in Table 1. 
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Figure 1: Accumulated Responses of Malaysia Macroeconomic
Variables to Innovations due to Recapitalization
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Figure 2: Accumulated Responses of Mexico Macroeconomic
Variables to Innovations due to Recapitalization
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Figure 3: Accumulated Responses of Nigeria Macroeconomic
Variables to Innovations due to Recapitalization
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Figure 4: Accumulated Responses of Spain Macroeconomic
Variables to Innovations due to Recapitalization
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Figure 5: Accumulated Responses of USA Macroeconomic Variables
to Innovations due to Recapitalization
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